On the afternoon of Dec. 30, 1862, Federal Capt. Warren P. Edgarton’s cannoneers of Battery E, 1st Ohio Artillery Regiment, were worn out and exhausted from hard marching and coping with bad weather.

They were moving in conjunction with infantry support under the command of Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnston’s 2nd Division of Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland on their way to cover the right flank of CSA Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’ division, advancing down the Franklin Pike, three miles or so west of Murfreesboro. As soon as Davis’ column had the Federals within range, Confederate artillery began to shell the Union infantrymen, forcing them to lie flat on the ground.

Brig. Gen. Edward N. Kirk ordered Edgarton’s battery forward, supported by a regiment of infantry. Covered by a thick cedar thicket, the gunners moved to within 700 yards of the Rebels, went into battery, and blasted out six rounds of solid shot, forcing the Confederate artillery to retire, leaving behind a wrecked caisson. Confederate infantry moved up in support, and the firing continued until dark.

Union Brig. Gen. August Willich’s1st brigade had formed on their flank, facing due south, and lay on the extreme right of Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook’s line. The men of Company E were tired and very hungry, and Kirk allowed them to go into bivouac amid a grove of cedars, 100 yards behind their initial position.

 Orders were given that there would be no fires that Tuesday evening, and Edgarton’s Ohioans ate hardtack and drank cold brackish water. The battery’s horses needed water, but in the darkness with Southern boys so near, the horses would have to wait until morning, kept in harness, hobbled near the guns and caissons.

At this same time, on this Tuesday evening of Dec. 30, 1862, Union Gen. William S. Rosecrans and Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg faced each other a few miles west of Murfreesboro. Bragg had waited all day Tuesday for the Federal attack that never came. Eager to seize the initiative, he took advantage of the Union lethargy and planned an assault of his own. After much discussion between Bragg and his corps commanders, Lt. Gens. Leonidas Polk and William J. Hardee, Polk suggested that his corps strike the right wing of McCook's corps. With no further debate, Bragg assented and the assault was staged to begin at dawn on Wednesday, Dec. 31. 

Unaware of this momentous Confederate strategy,  near sunrise just before the battle began, Edgarton had ordered half of the battery’s horses to be watered at a small stream 500 yards in the rear, and orders were given to build fires and make coffee. By early morning on the 31st, 4,400 Confederates were ready to attack. In the debacle that followed the initial attack, all of the battery guns were lost. Some accounts of the battle mention the absence of horses and suggest that it was a factor in the loss of guns.

Although the battery fought valiantly, the entire Union brigade was smashed, troops assigned to support it fled, and Kirk was killed. 

For the unfortunate Edgarton and his gunners, Stones River held no moments of glory. Captured, discredited and dishonored, Edgarton would be exchanged a few months later and then be called upon to report why he had sent half his horses to be watered on the morning of the fateful assault.

Laying much of the responsibility on the slain brigadier, Edward Kirk, Edgarton requested, “As I have been charged with grave errors on the occasion of the battle, I respectfully request that I may be ordered before a court of inquiry, that my conduct be investigated.”

No such investigation was ever completed, but a note was made of Edgarton’s performance at Stones River and placed in the official records: “Edgarton, captain. Company E, 1st Ohio Artillery … was guilty of a grave error in taking even a part of his battery horses to water at an unseasonable hour, and thereby losing his guns.” Edgarton’s military career was over, but at least he had his life – unlike many others who fell that fateful morning.

So, how many horses and mules were actually at the Battle of Stones River?

Almost all Union horses were property of the U.S. Army and fell under the quartermaster’s control, thus accurate numbers are more readily available, while most Confederate Cavalry horses were individually owned and fell under no one’s record keeping. When mounts were either lost or became unserviceable, the man was sent home to procure another. Kentucky-born Confederate Gen. John Hunt Morgan made many raids into his native state for the sole purpose of obtaining horses.

At the time of the Battle of Stones River, both Cavalry units under the command of Gens. Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan were on other missions – Forrest in West Tennessee and Morgan in Kentucky. While Rosecrans was obviously heartened by their absence, they perhaps accomplished far more as guerillas than they could have in the battle itself. They had performed a strategic role by drawing off Union forces far in excess of their own numbers. In Bragg’s report following the Battle of Stones River, both Morgan and Forrest were congratulated and Bragg commended them to the gratitude of the country. Morgan’s raid, in particular, proved once more that the Federal cavalry was still relatively weak, and his accomplishments stood out in contrast to Bragg’s retreat from Stones River. 

Based upon reports found in the War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, provided by Stones River National Battlefield, and taking into consideration gaps in the reports and the fact that many of the numbers include estimates based on the average horse/mule strength of artillery units and supply wagons or average losses of reporting units, the initial strength is seen in Estimates of initial horse/mule strength table.

The figures for Cavalry Horses & Officers Mounts – Confederate 4,237 (760) and Union 2,300 (860) - assumes one horse for every cavalryman reported. Officers’ mounts are estimated at the rate of 20 horses per 1,000 men.  

The figures for Draft Horses & Mules – Confederate 9,120 and Union 10,320 – is estimated based 40 wagons with six mule or horse teams per 1,000 men.

The estimate of Artillery Horses – Confederate 17,000 and Union 26,000 – is based on average of 100 horses per 6-gun battery and 60 horses per 4-gun battery.

Of the Artillery Horses, Killed, Disabled, or Captured, Confederate – 131 – this figure was determined for 104 horses reported killed by 19 of 24 batteries. The average loss was multiplied by the remaining five batteries.

This figure of 250 (196) Confederate Cavalry Horses lost is based on 150 horses reported killed or disabled by Brig. Gen. John Wharton. An additional 100 added to cover unreported losses of other brigades, which were not as heavily engaged. There was no estimate of Confederate Draft Horses and Mules killed.

The following correspondence is relative to an inventory of horses and mules used by the Army of the Cumberland:

Murfreesborough, Tenn., April 27, 1863

Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief

I report in reply to your telegraphic order. This army had, December 1, 1862 8,709 horses and 11,519 mules, received from the Department of the Ohio. Procured by capture or purchase since 18,450 horses and 14,607 mules. Sent off, unserviceable, 9,119 horses and 1,149 mules. On hand, March 23, 19,164 horses and 23,859 mules. A great mortality in team animals has resulted from the want of long forage, not procurable, for want of means of transportation. The cavalry horses, always overworked, consume rapidly. It is reported by the chief quartermaster that one-third of the animals now on hand are used up and unserviceable.

Yours truly,
W.S. ROSECRANS, Maj.-Gen.

Every living creature that had the misfortune to find itself in the middle of a battlefield suffered. Untold numbers died. The ordinary critters, such as rabbits and birds, are often overlooked.

A Union soldier in Bell Wiley’s The Life of Billy Yank noted: “At Murfreesborough, a flock of sparrows from the cedar thickets fluttered and circled above the field in a state of utter bewilderment, and scores of rabbits fled for protection to our men lying down in line of the left, nestling under their coats and creeping under their legs in a state of utter distraction. They hopped over the fields like toads, and as perfectly tamed by fright as household pets.”  

Horses and other beasts of burden were often in the direct line of fire. The dreadful accumulation of death and the misery accompanying it burned itself into the memory of those who survived to witness the horror. Two days after the Battle of Stones River had ended, Col. John Beatty, USA, wrote in a letter to his wife: “I ride over the battlefield. In one place a caisson and five horses are lying, the latter killed in harness, and all fallen together. … Many wounded horses are limping over the field. One mule, I heard of, had a leg blown off on the first day’s battle; next morning it was on the spot where first wounded; it was still standing there, not having moved all day, patiently suffering, it knew not why nor for what.”

War is cruelty.

“WAR IS HELL!”

“One way or another … the humble horse and his human masters soldiered on. Whether plodding through the dry, stifling dust, struggling in clinging mud, rushing to a position at a jolting gallop or creeping backward in a fighting withdrawal, the men- and the horses-always did what had to be done. They moved the guns.”

Brig. General E. P. Alexander, Chief of Artillery,Lt. Gen. James P. Longstreet’s Confederate Corps, CSA