By MIKE WEST Managing Editor

Col. Nicholas Greusel

Led by their German-born commander, the 36th Illinois stood their ground on what was left of the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland.

Col. Nicholas Greusel's unit had proved itself during the Battles of Pea Ridge and Perryville where his leadership resulted in him being elevated to brigade command.

Greusel was an experienced soldier who raised a regiment of Michigan volunteers for the Mexican War. He was an active Whig politician who had been elected alderman in Detroit before a financial reversal stripped him of his savings. He started over in the railroad industry, first as a conductor with the Michigan Central and later with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad. When Lincoln issued the call for volunteers, Greusel formed a regiment at Aurora, Ill.

When the Army of the Cumberland was reorganized, Greusel was placed in charge of the First Brigade of Brig. Gen. Philip Sheridan's Third Division. However, he was outranked when Brig. Gen. Joshua Sill, a West Point graduate, requested transfer to classmate Sheridan's unit.

Now outside of Murfreesboro, Greusel faced a major challenge. The green 24th Wisconsin on his right collapsed with hardly a shot fired, leaving the 36th exposed on two sides and under attack by the 19th Alabama led by Col. J.Q. Loomis.

Calmly, Greusel ordered his regiment to fix bayonets and hold their fire. A close-order volley stopped the Alabama Confederates. A brutal fight began and continued some 30 minutes until Sheridan directed the artillery of Capt. Henry Hescock and Capt. Charles Houthtaling's batteries on the rebels.

The confederates began to slowly withdraw and Greusel ordered his men to charge, dislodging the Alabamians. At a key moment, Loomis was struck down by a huge tree branch dislodged by artillery.

But Union Gen. Sill was dead as well.

Col. Greusel was quickly elevated to brigade command and Major Silas Miller assumed leadership of the 36th Illinois defending a line on what is known now as Medical Center Parkway. In the fighting thus far, the brigade had already lost 230 men dead or wounded.

Greusel readjusted his lines, moving the 44th Illinois and the 15th Missouri to the hole left by the stampeded Wisconsin troops.

The Confederates attacked again with Brig. Gen. Alfred Vaughn's men following the same path of Loomis' Alabama regiments. Woodruff's 25th Illinois and the 81st Indiana were hit hard and Col. Thomas Williams of the 25th was killed.

Vaughn's charge was effective despite heavy Confederate losses. Fifty-six percent of the 12th Tennessee Infantry was killed or wounded, but the remainder of the Union's original right wing fell back.

The 36th Illinois still held as Major Miller cursed the men who tried to run and cheered those who stood and fought until a minie ball struck him down as well.

Greusel's (Sill's) brigade was then attacked directly by Cheatham's third brigade, commanded by Col. A.M. Manigault. The unit was composed of the 10th and 19th South Carolina and three Alabama regiments. His was another late, piecemeal assault, not supported by other Confederate troops.

Manigault's men were cut to ribbons by Hescock and Houthaling's artillery, but the Confederates still pushed within 50 yards of the Federal line. Then the 85th Illinois stood and fired a volley that shook the scene like an earthquake.

The 85th had just witnessed one of the more unusual events of the Battle of Stones River. The unit, which hadn't seen action to that point, was amazed to see hordes of rabbits driven by the noise and fury of the battle.

"They hopped over the field like toads," said William Bickham of the 85th, "and as perfectly tamed by fright as household pets. Many officers witnessed it, remarking it as one of the most curious spectacles ever seen on a battle-field."

As Manigault retreated to the cheers of the Union troops, the 36th Illinois asked to redraw. The regiment was out of ammunition and had lost more than half of its men.

It was 8:30 a.m. on the morning of Dec. 31, 1862. Without directions from Maj. Gen. Alexander McCook, Sheridan quickly rallied survivors on the Harding Farm (located between Medical Center Parkway and Wilkinson Pike). What was left of Greusel's (Sill's) brigade — the 88th Illinois and the 21st Michigan —was positioned near outbuildings of the farm. What was left of Carlin's and Woodruff's brigades were there as well.

Sheridan had begun the battle with an effective force of 4,154 men, but the casualties were quickly mounting.

Two of the division's batteries were repositioned as well. Capt. Asahel Bush's 4th Indiana Battery was placed near the Harding house to protect Greusel. Houghtaling moved the 1st Illinois, Battery C to a wooded area 600 yards northeast of Bush. Hescock remained on a small ridge overlooking the Harding farm. The new positions would allow the Union artillery to hit advancing Confederates with cross fire.
Manigault's Confederates struck again. This time Brig. Gen. George Maney's Tennessee brigade joined them, but there was confusion in the lines. Maney, a Franklin attorney, had started the war as colonel of the 1st Tennessee regiment.

Manigault's South Carolinians stalled under the heavy cannon fire from Bush and Houghtaling before Maney's men could strike.

Seeing that the Rebels were pinned down, Col. George Roberts of Sheridan's 3rd Brigade, asked for permission to counter attack. Sheridan quickly agreed.

Robert's quickly formed his regiments in an open field facing the Harding house. The fresh troops moved past Greusel's regiments, realigned themselves and the command was given, "Charge bayonets."
"Suddenly the grand form of Colonel Roberts could be seen riding in rear of the regiment, telling officers not to let a shot be fired; then, wheeling around the left wing, he rode in front of the regiment along the whole line, with his cap in his hand, cheering the men to endless enthusiasm, and shouting to them: "Don't fire a shot! Drive them with the bayonet."

Manigault's infantry opened fire on Roberts, but he was not struck. His unit moved forward and when the command "Charge" was given, they burst upon the Confederates, who ran with the Illinois soldiers pursuing them through the woods and a cornfield back a fence that had been the position of the 24th Wisconsin earlier than morning. Seeking Maney's troops forming, Roberts withdrew.

Sheridan used the lull to formulate a third position.

"At this juncture, the enemy's turning column began advancing again in concert with Cheatham's division, and as the extreme left of the Confederates was directed on Griscom's (Gresham) house, and their right on the Blanton house, my new position was in danger of envelopment. No hope of stemming the tide at this point seemed probably, but to gain time, I retained my ground as long as possible," Sheridan wrote.

He selected Colonel Robert's brigade to anchor the new position in the cedars.

Sheridan's holding action was both helped and hampered by the unique terrain of open fields surrounded by cedar brakes and limestone outcroppings.

The dense woods and the rock made for a great defensive position, but it hampered communications between regiments and made withdrawal and repositioning of troops difficult. Union troops would soon find themselves running out of ammunition and trapped in the rough terrain.

While Sheridan moved his troops the Confederates Manigault and Maney devised a new strategy of their own. They would overwhelm the Union batteries by force of numbers.

The Illinois troops, all too familiar with the meat packing houses of Chicago, would soon call the rock encrusted area the "slaughter pen."