| Disheartened at Stones River, Confederates retreat south |
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By: By Mike West, Managing editor
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Gen. Braxton Bragg
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As the bodies of the dead and wounded crowded into Murfreesboro’s public buildings, Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg decided upon his next move: Retreat.
Retreat?
Had not Bragg loudly proclaimed victory after the first day of Stones River?
He telegraphed Richmond _ a huge mistake _ to crow:
“The enemy has yielded his strong position and is falling back. We occupy the whole field and shall follow him .... God has granted us a happy New Year,” wired Bragg.
The Confederate general was not lying to headquarters. The first day of the battle was a victory for the South. The Union Army of the Cumberland was pushed back, but didn’t break and run back to safety in Nashville.
Bragg’s scouts had brought him word that Union wagon trains were headed to Tennessee’s capital city, but those wagons were filled with the Army of the Cumberland’s wounded. The bulk of Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans’ forces still occupied the field near the Nashville Pike and was reinforcing their positions.
When Rosecrans didn’t retreat, Bragg decided to give them a nudge by sending Gen. John C. Breckinridge’s division to assault them on Jan. 2, 1863. That, as previously discussed, was a disaster.
Now, Bragg’s confidence and the support of his general staff hit rock bottom. Rumors roared through the Confederate camp saying Bragg planned to renew his assault the following day.
That rumor hit division commanders Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham and Gen. James Withers particularly hard. Their forces were seriously depleted from the first day’s action. Cheatham had lost 36 percent of his troops and Withers 28 percent. Between them, they had only some 7,000 effectives and were the only Confederate units on the west side of Stones River.
After hours of discussion, Cheatham and Withers composed a most unusual letter to General Bragg.
“This army should be promptly put into retreat” was the message they penned and sent to their direct commander, Gen. Leonidas Polk.
Polk signed off on the letter and forwarded it by courier to Bragg, who was awakened at 2 a.m.
“Say to General Polk that we shall hold our own at every hazard.”
With dawn’s light, the grumpy Confederate general had a change of mind and heart. Bragg called Polk and Gen. William Hardee to his headquarters at 10 a.m. By noon, he was issuing orders to prepare troops for a night march south.
Bragg’s decision remains fodder for discussion until today. It is generally accepted that Bragg believed he was seriously outnumbered and that Union reinforcements were on the way.
Bragg based that fear on a report from his cavalry commander, Gen. Joseph Wheeler, and from documents captured from Union Gen. Alexander McCook saying the army had 70,000 soldiers. (Both reports were wrong.)
And there was the Cheatham/Withers’ letter that advised, “we do fear great disaster from the condition of things now existing, and think it should be averted if possible.”
That letter reflects the lack of confidence Bragg’s generals had in their commander. This problem began on the retreat from Perryville to Murfreesboro and began to fester at Stones River.
Bragg was indecisive and overly strict when it came to commanding the Army of Tennessee. That curious mix of traits cost him the support of his troops and pushed away important allies among the Confederate high command. He did, however, have the ear and the unwavering support of Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America.
Particularly ugly was the resentment between Bragg and his troops from the border state of Kentucky. He used the 1862 Confederate “Conscript Act” to draft Kentuckians into his army. Breckinridge, the former vice president of the United States, fought Bragg over conscription because Kentucky was still part of the Union.
There was no ending the bad blood between Bragg and Breckinridge when on Dec. 26, Bragg ordered the execution of Kentucky Private Asa Lewis for desertion at Murfreesboro. Lewis, a Kentucky conscript, had left the army following Perryville and had vowed to return after some family duties were resolved.
Then when Bragg ordered Breckinridge’s troops to charge across Stones River on Jan. 2, most of the Kentuckians were sure their commanding general had purposely tried to slaughter them.
Not only did Bluegrass State troops hate Bragg and the conscription law, the feeling was universal among the Army of Tennessee.
Pvt. Sam Watkins, of the 1st Tennessee Infantry, expressed his feelings:
“Soldiers had enlisted for twelve months only, and had faithfully complied with their volunteer obligations; the terms for which they had enlisted had expired, and they naturally looked upon it that they had a right to go home. They had done their duty faithfully and well. They wanted to see their families; in fact, wanted to go home anyhow. War had become a reality; they were tired of it. A law had been passed by the Confederate States Congress called the conscript act. ... From this time on till the end of the war, a soldier was simply a machine, a conscript. It was mighty rough on rebels. We cursed the war, we cursed Bragg, we cursed the Southern Confederacy. All our pride and valor had gone, and we were sick of war and the Southern Confederacy.
"A law was made by the Confederate States Congress about this time allowing every person who owned twenty negroes to go home. It gave us the blues; we wanted twenty negroes. Negro property suddenly became very valuable, and there was raised the howl of 'rich man's war, poor man's fight.' The glory of the war, the glory of the South, the glory and pride of our volunteers had no charms for the conscript.”
And to top it off, the Army of Tennessee was tired of retreating.
Some, like Brig. Gen. St. John Liddell, were ready to fight and suggested cutting off Rosecrans from his supply lines in Nashville.
“If you will throw your army between Rosecrans and Nashville, you will cut off all reinforcements. They will withdraw at the sight of your forces. Then I would fight Rosecrans to the last. I would rather bury my bones here than give up this field and our previous successes,” Liddell said.
But Bragg could sense the lack of support.
“General, I know that you will fight it out, but others will not,” Bragg responded.
The terrible weather than began during the Battle of Stones River continued. It was near freezing, rainy and muddy.
When Breckinridge’s division began the retreat at 10 p.m. the mud was nearly 10 inches deep on the Nashville Pike. Withers followed. Bragg and his staff left at 11:30 p.m. for Shelbyville. Cheatham moved out at 1 a.m. with Cleburne and McCown leaving Murfreesboro at dawn. The wounded were left behind at the Courthouse, Soule College and even at private homes like the Harding’s on the battlefield.
“The retreat was a nightmare of suffering. It rained incessantly, the temperature hovered about freezing, and rations were short. The Sixth Kentucky received food only after it had marched eighteen miles on 4 January, and then was issued simply six ounces of flour,” wrote Peter Cozzens in his “The Battle of Stones River _ No Better Place to Die.”
A woman who watched the troops leave Murfreesboro saw utter defeat in their mannerisms.
“The retreat! It was the grandest, saddest sight were ever saw...
“No other sound broke the stillness ... only the ceaseless foot-steps of the retreating heroes, that followed each other in rapid succession, disturbed the breathless silence ... Not a word was spoken.
“The author of these lines saw amid the dreary, falling rain, the dim out lines of a gallant army that was passing away! And leaving their homes to the mercy of a bloodthirsty enemy – and dropped bitter, burning tears.” |
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