| Garfield’s report puts Union army into action |
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By: MIKE WEST, Managing Editor
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Posted: Sunday, August 17, 2008 8:10 am
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William A. Garfield
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When it came to serving as chief of staff of the Army of the Cumberland, Brig. Gen. James A. Garfield took the bull by the horns when it came to getting the stagnant Union force up and moving.
Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commanding the army, was reluctant to follow up the Confederate retreat from Murfreesboro following the battle of Stones River. He believed that his army had not yet recovered from the bloody conflict. He also resented the constant prodding from the top brass in Washington.
Arriving in Murfreesboro on his new assignment, Garfield was faced by the growing hostility between Rosecrans and Union General-in-Chief H.W. Halleck.
Halleck tried to motivate Rosecrans with the old carrot and stick method, threatening to remove him one moment and offering him a promotion the next.
Rosecrans, a U.S. Military Academy graduate, was a major general of volunteers, a post with less pay and prestige as the same title in the regular U.S. Army.
So Halleck let it be known that the first general to win an “important and decisive victory” in the field would be awarded a vacant major-generalship in the regular army.
Rosecrans viewed the offer as an insult and responded in haste and in anger.
“As an officer and citizen, I feel degraded at such an auctioneering of honors. Have we a General who would fight for his own personal benefit, when he would not for honor and his country?” Rosecrans wrote.
Garfield apparently agreed with the spirit of Rosecrans’ response but saw it as incautious. As a growing force among the ranks of the Radical Republicans, Garfield chose to attempt to mediate between his commanding general and army brass.
As part of his strategy, Garfield chose to advocate action by the Army of the Cumberland, which was a position in sharp contrast with Rosecrans and his corps commanders who believed a move forward was hazardous.
But as chief of staff, Garfield organized a “spy ring” led by Capt. D. G. Swaim, assistant adjutant-general, chief of the army’s secret service. Swaim and his operatives were responsible for reporting on the condition and movements of the Confederate Army of Tennessee.
Swaim was to remain a key, trusted figure during the rest of Garfield’s life and was present when his commander-in-chief expired.
Based on Swaim’s reports, Garfield perceived the Confederates to be weak, undermanned and ill equipped. Rosecrans asked his 17 general officers to express their opinions on the issue in writing. All agreed with Rosecrans that an advance was ill advised.
Garfield proved to be unflappable. Instead of giving up, he pressed his point by creating a report unlike any other drafted during the Civil War.
He analyzed Rosecrans confidential letter to his generals and said it consisted of five basic questions:
1. “Has the enemy in our front been materially weakened by detachments to Johnston, or elsewhere?” Six of the generals said yes, 11 answered no.
2. “Can this army advance on him at this time with strong, reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle?” Two answered yes, 11 no.
3. Do you think an advance of our army at present likely to prevent additional re-enforcements being sent against General Grant by the enemy in our front? Four answered yes, 11 no.
4. Do you think an immediate advance of this army advisable? Two didn’t answer, 15 said no.
5. Do you think an early advance advisable? Two answered no.
Garfield listed some of their reasons for being against an advance.
Some said it was bad to risk the Union’s “reserve army” following the defeat of Hooker’s army and Grant’s pending action at Vicksburg. Others said it would dangerously expose the Army of Cumberland’s line of communication. One even said the Army of Tennessee was stronger.
Based upon reports from Swaim and Brig. Gen. Phillip Sheridan, Garfield gave an estimate of troop strength of both armies.
“In this estimate of Bragg’s present strength I have placed all doubts in his favor, and I have no question that my estimate is considerable beyond the truth. General Sheridan, who has taken great pains to collect evidence on this point, places it considerable below these figures,” he wrote.
“There will be 65,136 bayonets and sabres to throw against Bragg’s 41,680,” Garfield said.
He ended his report with a series of conclusions. Here’s a summary of them:
“Bragg’s army is now weaker than it has been since the battle of Stone River, or is likely to be again for the present, while our army has reached its maximum strength, and we have no right to expect re-enforcements for several months, if at all.
“Whatever be the result at Vicksburg, the determination of its fate will give large re-enforcements to Bragg....
“I refuse to entertain a doubt that his army, which in January last defeated Bragg’s superior numbers, cannot overwhelm his present greatly inferior forces.”
“The most unfavorable course for us that Bragg could take would be fall back without giving us battle, but this would be very disastrous to him....”
“The chances are more than ever that a sudden and rapid movement would compel a general engagement, and the defeat of Bragg would be in the highest degree disastrous to the rebellion.
“The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal states renders a decisive blow against the enemy at this time of the highest importance to the success of the Government at the polls, and in the enforcement of the Conscription Act.
“The Government and the War Department believe that his army ought to move upon the enemy....”
Garfield said a sudden and effective move could crush Bragg’s army and could collapse the Rebel government. The Army of the Cumberland is ready and prepared to move within 24 hours, he said.
His report proved very effective and it certainly improved Garfield’s standing with the Washington brass. Rosecrans issued orders for the army to prepare to move and within 12 days the initial step in the Tullahoma Campaign began.
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