| Deception, firepower made Hoover’s Gap an easy victory |
|
By: MIKE WEST, Managing Editor
|
Posted: Sunday, September 21, 2008 7:38 am
|
 Email  Print
|
Col. John T. Wilder
|
|
|
Deception was the name of the game as the Union Army of the Cumberland finally moved against the Confederate Army of Tennessee entrenched in the Highland Rim.
Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans would feign attacks both left and right of his true destination at Hoover’s Gap.
Rosecrans’ army was organized into three corps. The 21st Corps, lead by Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden would move against the Confederate left via Readyville. Joining Crittenden was Col. Robert Minty’s 4th Michigan Cavalry Brigade.
Minty’s Brigade was later to win worldwide fame when they captured Confederate President Jefferson Davis on May 10, 1865.
The 20th Corps, commanded by Gen. Alexander M. McCook, was to move along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, with Gen. D.S. Stanley’s cavalry, to Shelbyville.
Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding the 14th Corps, was to advance south on the Manchester Pike, spearheaded by Col. John T. Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade.
Wilder’s “Hatchet” Brigade, armed with their rapid-fire Spencer rifles, would win the day for Rosecrans. The weapons gave the 2,000-man unit firepower equal to that of a full division.
“Our men adore them as the heathen do their idols,” wrote one of Wilder’s troopers.
Some of the commanders feared that the Spencers would fall into enemy hands.
“General Stanley seemed anxious to send a cavalry brigade with General Thomas, as he said, to take care of Wilder’s ‘tadpole’ cavalry, as he called us, fearing Wilder would rush into the enemy and get captured, and Stanley assured General Rosecrans that if Wilder’s brigade were captured there would be no need for cavalry about,” wrote Wilder in his account of the Battle of Hoover’s Gap.
Stanley didn’t have anything to worry about. The “tadpole” cavalry was about to get extremely froggy.
At 3 a.m. June 24, 1863, Wilder’s brigade moved south through Murfreesboro and took the point position for the 14th Corps. Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Reynold’s 4th Division followed in the advance.
The mounted infantry moved at a quick walk toward Hoover’s Gap, which was 10 miles south of town. The gap was protected by the 3rd Kentucky Cavalry Regiment of Col. J.R. Butler of Gen. Abram Buford’s Confederate cavalry brigade.
“Hoover’s Gap was a narrow valley through a line of lumpy hills, some four miles in extent and about three hundred feet high, the hills being wooded and thickly grown with underbrush and green briers, making it impracticable for cavalry. The turnpike, a good macadamized road, wound through this narrow pass for some four miles in extent, following the little brook, one the headwaters of Stone’s River,” Wilder wrote.
By 8 a.m. a steady rain had set in, hampering the movements of both armies.
A mile north of the entrance to the gap, Wilder’s advance guard flushed the Confederate pickets.
“We at once charged them at a gallop in a column of fours, surprising and dispersing Buford’s command, who were in bivouac at the gap, routing them in disorder, without even time to saddle or mount their horses,” Wilder said.
The Confederate cavalry failed to alert a Rebel infantry brigade under the command of Brig. Gen. William B. Bate. So the Union forces moved ahead, hoping to surprise them as well.
“Judge my astonishment, when we reached their supposed position, to find no force there. Looking down the valley to the village of Beech Grove, two miles to the west, down the valley of the Garrison Fork, we could see the tents of an encampment,” Wilder said.
The Union forces dismounted and formed a line with three regiments stretched across the gap and roadway and the 98th Illinois held in reserve. The 18th Indiana battery was positioned to cover the infantry. Lt. Col. Kirkpatrick was ordered to move his scouts and five companies ahead to “stir up” the Rebels.
Bate’s brigade belonged to Gen. A.P. Stewart’s division and was placed along the valley formed by Garrison Fork.
“Many of the officers of Bate’s brigade were at a spring holding a Masonic picnic in honor of St. John, it being the 24th of June, St. John’s day,” Wilder said. “Colonel Kirkpatrick road into their camp and had time to take seven wagons loaded with tobacco out with him and bring them back to our men, who had ‘tobacco to burn.’”
Bate, perceiving the attack as a cavalry raid, quickly sent troops, including the 20th Tennessee in response.
“We allowed him to come within about one hundred yards up a gentle slope in front of our line when we opened a terrible fire from our Spencer rifles, and Captain Lilly poured double-shotted canister from his ten-pound Rodman guns into their lines, which staggered and repulsed them with severe loss,” Wilder wrote.
The 20th Tennessee attempted to turn the right flank of the 17th Indiana, but failed when the 98th Illinois moved in. Confederate artillery opened up on the Union forces from a distance of a half mile.
“The effect of our terrible fire was overwhelming to our opponents, who bravely tried to withstand its effects. No human being could successfully face such an avalanche of destruction as our continuous fire swept through their lines,” Wilder wrote, referring to the Spencer repeating rifles. Most of Wilder’s 2,000 men were equipped with the seven-shooters.
Suddenly, Capt. Rice (Reynolds’ adjutant general) rode up with orders for Wilder to fall back immediately. Wilder refused to Rice’s amazement.
“I told him I would hold this position against any force, and to tell General Reynolds to come on without hurrying, as there was no danger of our being driven out of the position,” the colonel said.
Rice repeated the orders and threatened to have Wilder arrested and replaced by Col. Miller. Rice left just as most of A.P. Stewart’s division counter attacked in a heavy rain. Bate’s brigade, joined by Gen. Bushrod Johnson’s brigade, were again quickly repulsed by the Spencers. While fighting continued much of the day, the Confederates fell back and Rosecrans, accompanied by Thomas and Brig. Gen. William A. Garfield, rode up to the position with their staff and escorts.
Rosecrans asked Wilder what he had done. He gave the commanding general a brief answer and quickly admitted to refusing the order to withdraw.
“General Rosecrans took off his hat and handed it to an orderly, and grasped my hand in both of his, saying: ‘You took the responsibility to disobey the order, did you? Thank God for your decision. It would have cost us 2,000 lives to have taken this position if you had given it up,’” Wilder recalled.
Reynolds, who had issued the order, also commended him.
The brigade’s action enabled Rosecrans to break through the Army of Tennessee’s right center and allowed the Union to threaten Bragg’s flank and rear, forcing him to pull back to Tullahoma and soon to Chattanooga, surrendering Middle Tennessee.
At first the Confederates couldn’t comprehend what happened. They just knew a tremendous amount of firepower had been brought to bear on their forces at Hoover’s Gap. Thinking conventionally, Bate and others believed they were outnumbered by five to one. Only Gen. Patrick Cleburne referred to the continual fire in his reports.
Typically an infantry unit would try to draw the enemy’s fire before they were really in range, then advance while their foes reloaded for another volley.
That’s what the 20th Tennessee did when they moved against the 17th Indiana.
“The enemy approached within range, and received a volley from the 17th, that checked but did not stay them. Supposing our guns exhausted, a cheer followed the report, and they moved on. Against Wilder’s exhaustless weapons – the Spencer rifles ... pour in their rain of bullets,” wrote John Fitch in his Annals of the Army of the Cumberland.
The relentless Union fire confounded the Confederates who were dropping in large numbers and they continued to move toward the 17th. Suddenly the 98th Illinois moved up from their reserve position and finished. The Confederates were staggered by the mass firing, turned and retreated, leaving their dead and wounded on the field.
The Confederates, hampered by heavy rain, pulled back to Fairfield and then Tullahoma. Rebel casualties totaled about 200 – about a quarter of Bate’s force. Wilder lost only 51 men dead or wounded.
Thus an important step was made to taking Chattanooga and Atlanta. It should be pointed out that if the 14th Corps had raced to Tullahoma, the Army of Tennessee could have been cut off from retreating to Chattanooga, but that wasn’t part of Rosecrans’ master plan.
Thomas, who was one to never move quickly, was pleased by the day of fighting and joined the chorus of praise for Wilder.
“You have saved the lives of a thousand men by your gallant conduct today. I didn’t expect to get the gap for three days,” Thomas told them.
The following morning a general order from Thomas was read to every regiment of the 14th Corps describing the brigade’s action at Hoover’s Gap and saying the brigade’s conduct should be emulated by the rest of the corps. It also recommended Wilder’s promotion to brigadier general.
Wilder’s “Hatchet” Brigade was thenceforth called “The Lightning Brigade.”
|
|
Digg
Facebook
MySpace
Yahoo!