| Battle between generals begins after Stones River |
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By: By MIKE WEST, Managing editor
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Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk
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Confusion and disillusionment turned the attitude of the Confederate Army of Tennessee from bad to worse as they made a disorganized retreat from Murfreesboro in the early days of January 1863.
The Confederates began their march southward in a driving rain on Jan. 3 with short, or in some cases, no rations.
Gen. Braxton Bragg moved to establish headquarters at Winchester and ordered corps commanders Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk to Shelbyville and Lt. Gen. William Hardee to Tullahoma.
When Polk reported the Union Army of the Cumberland was not pursuing, Bragg amended his plan and told Hardee to halt at Wartrace and Polk to stay at Shelbyville. He set up headquarters at Tullahoma and began to plan a defense along the Duck River and the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad.
While army’s command staff agreed – at first – with Bragg’s decision to retreat, the rank and file believed they had again been sold out.
“Common prudence and the safety of my army, upon which even the safety of our cause depended, left no doubt on my mind as to the necessity of my withdrawal from so unequal a contest. My orders were accordingly given about noon for the movement of the trains, and for the necessary preparation of the troops,” Bragg wrote in his official report, filed on Feb. 23.
By the time his report was penned, Bragg was already under fire from his subordinate generals, men and the Confederate high command. But the strongest criticism came from Southern newspapers, like the Chattanooga Daily Rebel, which had proclaimed Bragg’s victory at Murfreesboro only to discover that the Army of Tennessee was defeated and in retreat.
Harvey Magee Watterson, a former U.S. Congressman and father of famous journalist Henry Watterson, edited the Daily Rebel. This newspaper raised, in print, the charge that Bragg had retreated against the advice of his generals.
In Tullahoma, Bragg even faced criticism from Tennessee residents, like the man he stopped and asked for directions. The general asked him if he belonged to “Bragg’s Army.”
“Bragg’s Army,” repeated the man. “Bragg’s got no army. He shot half of them himself in Kentucky, and the Yankees killed the other half of them at Murfreesboro,” wrote Stanley F. Horn in “The Army of Tennessee.”
The turmoil and rumors prompted Bragg to make a rash decision. He decided to refute the allegations about his leadership and made a serious tactical blunder as a result.
Bragg, in a letter dated Jan. 11, asked his corps and division commanders to refute the published allegation that he retreated against their advice.
“It becomes necessary for me to save my fair name, if I can not stop the deluge of abuse which will destroy my usefulness and demoralize this army,” Bragg wrote.
The general asked his subordinates to write letters attesting to the fact they agreed with his suggestion to retreat. But an inaccurate statement accompanied his request that the decision to withdraw “was resisted by me for some time after advised by my corps and division commanders.”
Bragg asked them to be candid in their responses, adding that Gen. Kirby Smith had been called to Richmond to possibly replace him.
Here’s where Bragg shot himself in the foot.
“I shall retire without a regret if I find I have lost the good opinion of my generals, upon whom I have ever relied as upon a foundation of rock,” he wrote.
That little statement gave his subordinates the opening they were looking for and several of them took full advantage.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham wrote a short note admitting that he was among the first to suggest a retreat. His superior, Gen. Polk, was on leave in North Carolina and attempted to dodge the issue.
Hardee pointed out that he had concurred with Bragg’s decision, but said neither him nor his division commanders had made any proposal to withdraw. Hardee said he had consulted with his commanders and they “are unanimous in their opinion that a change in the command of this army is necessary. In this opinion I concur.”
Division commander Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne stung Bragg as well.
“I have consulted with all my brigade commanders ... and they unite with me in personal regard for yourself, in high appreciation of your patriotism and gallantry ... but at the same time they see, with regret, and it has also met my observation, that you do not possess the confidence of the army in other respects in that degree necessary to secure success,” Cleburne reported.
And what could Bragg expected from Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge? They had battled before, during and after the battle of Stones River about Bragg’s ill-treatment of Kentucky troops.
Breckinridge was less harsh than you might imagine but his statement did echo that of Cleburne. The former vice president of the United States said his brigadiers showed respect for Bragg’s patriotism, but “it is their opinion that you do not possess the confidence of the army to an extent which will enable you to be useful as its commander. In this opinion I feel bound to state that I concur.”
Polk, arriving back from leave, again tried to waffle on the issue.
On Jan. 30, he wrote Bragg a letter asking for a clarification on his Jan. 11 letter. Polk asked Bragg if he was correct in saying the commanding general was seeking two things: a written statement on responsibility for the retreat and a statement on Bragg’s fitness to command.
Bragg responded that he was only seeking the statement concerning responsibility for the retreat, saying the confidence statement was only a venting of his own feelings.
This gave Polk, whose opinion was very important on this issue, an escape clause. The general wrote a short letter that the original letter written by Cheatham and Withers and endorsed by Polk showed evidence of their support for the retreat.
Polk was in a delicate position. Not only was he a bishop in the Episcopal Church, he was the West Point roommate of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. He thought that past relationship gave him a friendly ear at the Confederate “White House.”
Polk’s answer placated Bragg, but left Hardee and the other generals appearing as malcontents.
After hearing their complaints, Polk decided to write a personal letter to Davis. He also attached all the other correspondence, adding:
“Had I and my division commanders been asked to answer, our replies would have coincided with those of the officers of the other corps.”
Polk wrote Davis that Bragg should be transferred and command be given to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, who was commander of the Department of the West.
In response, Davis told Johnston about the dissatisfaction with Bragg and ordered him to Tennessee to investigate the charges.
While this seems a logical solution to the problems in Tennessee, actually it was a subtle piece of gamesmanship on Davis’ part apparently designed to placate both Polk and Bragg.
Bragg was the Confederate president’s close friend as well, while his relationship with Johnston was strained at best. Johnston perceived the request as a trap. He inspected the army, gave it a glowing report and reported that Bragg should not be removed.
Now things grew even more complicated.
Davis was not satisfied with Johnston’s report and sent word that Bragg should report to Richmond while Johnston assumed temporary command of the Army of Tennessee. He would deal with Polk’s complaints later.
Johnston reported by rail to Tullahoma only to discover Bragg consumed by the serious, possibly critical illness of his wife. He did assume command, but Bragg stayed in Tullahoma while his wife recovered.
Meanwhile, Johnston contracted a serious illness and on April 10 was declared to be unable to actively serve in the field. By default, Bragg was returned to command.
That prompted Polk to write an even more passionate letter to Davis, repeating his suggestion that Johnston should lead the Army of Tennessee and that Bragg be transferred to the inspector general’s office. It took nearly a month more for Johnston to recover and Davis took no action.
In Richmond, the Confederate Congress got into the act by holding up a resolution thanking Bragg and the Army of Tennessee for their efforts at Stones River with the Kentucky congressional delegation acting behind the scenes. Pro-Bragg congressmen threatened to challenge the rights of the Kentuckians (their state never seceded from the Union) to even serve in the Confederate Congress and the matter was dropped.
Naturally Bragg put the blame for that political maneuvering on Breckinridge.
Instead of making peace, Bragg added Polk to his enemy’s list, writing a letter to all of other generals questioning Polk’s actions during the Battle of Perryville. None of them took the bait, but Hardee showed the letter to Polk.
The battle between Bragg and his generals would continue.
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